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Abstract. We study the fair division of items to agents supposing that agents can
form groups. We thus give natural generalizations of popular concepts such as
envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency to groups of fixed sizes. Group envy-freeness
requires that no group envies another group. Group Pareto efficiency requires that
no group can be made better off without another group be made worse off. We
study these new group properties from an axiomatic viewpoint. We thus propose
new fairness taxonomies that generalize existing taxonomies. We further study
near versions of these group properties as allocations for some of them may not
exist. We finally give three prices of group fairness between group properties for
three common social welfares (i.e. utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash).
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Introduction
Fair divisions become more and more challenging in the present world due to the ever-
increasing demand for resources. This pressure forces us to achieve more complex al-
locations with less available resources. An especially challenging case of fair division
deals with the allocation of free-of-charge and indivisible items (i.e. items cannot be
divided, items cannot be purchased) to agents cooperating in groups (i.e. each agent
maximizes multiple objectives) in the absence of information about these groups and
their group preferences. For example, food banks in Australia give away perishable
food products to charities that feed different groups of the community (e.g. Muslims)
[18,20]. As a second example, social services in Germany provide medical benefits,
donated food and affordable education to thousands of refugees and their families. We
often do not know the group members or how they share group preferences for re-
sources. Some other examples are the allocations of office rooms to research groups
[12], cake to groups of guests [16,33], land to families [26], hospital rooms to medical
teams [35] and memory to computer networks [31].
In this paper, we consider the fair division of items to agents under several assump-
tions. For example, the collection of items can be a mixture of goods and bads (e.g.
meals, chores) [6,10,28]. We thus assume that each agent has some aggregate utility
for a given bundle of items of another agent. However, these utilities can be shared
arbitrarily among the sub-bundles of the bundle (e.g. monotonically, additively, mod-
ularly, etc.). As another example, the agents can form groups in an arbitrarily manner.
We thus assume that each group has some aggregate utility for a given bundle of items
of another group. As in [33], we consider arithmetic-mean group utilities. We study this
problem for five main reasons. First, people form groups naturally in practice (e.g. fam-
ilies, teams, countries). Second, group preferences are more expressive than individual
preferences but also more complex (e.g. complementarities, substitutabilities). Third,
we seek new group properties as many existing ones may be too demanding (e.g. coali-
tional fairness). Fourth, the principles in which groups form are normally not known.
Fifth, with arithmetic-mean group utilities, we generalize existing fairness taxonomies
[4,5] and characterization results for Pareto efficiency [9].
Two of the most important criteria in fair division are envy-freeness (i.e. no agent
envies another agent) and Pareto efficiency (i.e. no agent can be made better off with-
out another agent be made worse off) [14,15,17,43]. We propose new generalizations
of these concepts for groups of fixed sizes. Group envy-freeness requires that no group
envies another group. Group Pareto efficiency requires that no group can be made bet-
ter off without another group be made worse off. We thus construct new sets of fairness
properties, that let us interpolate between envy-freeness and proportionality (i.e. each
agent gets 1/n their total utility for bundles), and utilitarian efficiency (i.e. the sum
of agent’s utilities is maximized) and Pareto efficiency. There is a reason why we fo-
cus on these two common properties and say not on other attractive properties such as
group strategy-proofness. Group strategy-proofness may not be achievable with lim-
ited knowledge of the groups [3]. By comparison, both group envy-freeness and group
Pareto efficiency are achievable. For example, the allocation of each bundle uniformly
at random among agents is group envy-free, and the allocation of each bundle to a given
agent is group Pareto efficient. This example further motivates why we study these two
properties in isolation. In some instances, no allocation satisfies them in combination.
Common computational problems about group envy-freeness and group Pareto ef-
ficiency are inherently intractable even for problems of relatively small sizes [8,13,25].
For this reason, we focus on the axiomatic analysis of these properties. We propose a
taxonomy of n layers of group envy-freeness properties such that group envy-freeness
at layer k implies (in a logical sense) group envy-freeness at layer k + 1. This is per-
haps a good news because envy-free allocations often do not exist and, as we show,
allocations satisfying some properties in our taxonomy always exist. We propose an-
other taxonomy of n layers of group Pareto efficiency properties such that group Pareto
efficiency at layer k + 1 implies group Pareto efficiency at layer k. Nevertheless, it is
not harder to achieve group Pareto efficiency than Pareto efficiency and such alloca-
tions still always exists. We also consider α-taxonomies of near group envy-freeness
and near group Pareto efficiency properties for each α ∈ [0, 1]. We finally use prices of
group fairness to measure the “loss” in welfare efficiency between group properties.
Our paper is organized as follows. We next discuss related work and define our
notions. We then present our taxonomy for group envy-freeness in the cases in which
agents might be envy of groups (Theorem 1), groups might be envy of agents (The-
orem 2) and groups might be envy of groups (Theorem 3). We continue with our
taxonomy for group Pareto efficiency (Theorem 4) and generalize an important result
from Pareto efficiency to group Pareto efficiency (Theorem 5). Further, we propose tax-
onomies of properties approximating group envy-freeness and group Pareto efficiency.
Finally, we give the prices of group fairness (Theorem 6) and conclude our work.
Related work
Group fairness has been studied in the literature. Some notions compare the bundle of
each group of agents to the bundle of any other group of agents based on Pareto dom-
inance (i.e. all agents are weakly happier, and some agents are strictly happier) pref-
erence relations (e.g. coalitional fairness, strict fairness) [19,23,27,32,41,42,45]. Coali-
tional fairness implies both envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. Perhaps this might be
too demanding in practice as very often such allocations do not exist. For example, for
a given allocation, it requires complete knowledge of agents’ utilities for any bundles
of items of any size in the allocation, whereas our notions require only knowledge of
agents’ utilities for their own bundles and the bundles of other agents in the allocation.
Other group fairness notions are based on the idea that the bundle of each group should
be perceived as fair by as many agents in the group as possible (e.g. unanimously envy-
freeness, h-democratic fairness, majority envy-freeness) [34,39]. The authors suppose
that the groups are disjoint and known (e.g. families), and the utilities of agents for items
are known, whereas we suppose that the groups are unknown, thus possibly overlap, and
the utilities of agents are in a bundle form.
More group fairness notions have been studied in the context of cake-cutting (e.g.
arithmetic-mean-proportionality, geometric-mean-proportionality, minimum-proporti-
onality, median-proportionality) [33]. These notions compare the aggregate bundle of
each group of agents to their proportional (wrt the number of groups) aggregate bundle
of all items. Unlike us, the authors assume that the group members and their mono-
tonic valuations are part of the common knowledge. Group envy-freeness notions are
also already used in combinatorial auctions with additive quasi-linear utilities and mon-
etary transfers (e.g. envy-freeness of an individual towards a group, envy-freeness of
a group towards a group) [40]. The authors assume that the agents’ utilities for items
and item prices are known. Conceptually, our notions of group envy-freeness resemble
these notions but they do not use prices. We additionally study notions of near group
fairness. Our near group fairness notions for groups of agents are inspired by α-fairness
for individual agents [11,21,22,36,37].
Most of these existing works consider allocating divisible resources (e.g. land, cake)
with money (e.g. exchange economies), whereas we consider allocating indivisible
items without money. We further cannot directly apply most of these existing prop-
erties to our setting with unknown groups, bundle utilities and priceless items. As a
result, we cannot directly inherit any of the existing results. In contrast, we can apply
our group properties in settings in which the group members and their preferences are
actually known. Therefore, our results are valid in some existing settings. Our prop-
erties are new and cannot be defined using the existing fairness framework proposed
in [4]. Moreover, existing works are somehow related to our properties of group envy-
freeness. However, we additionally propose properties of group Pareto efficiency. Also,
most existing properties may not be guaranteed even with a single indivisible item (e.g.
coalitional fairness). By comparison, many of our group envy-freeness properties and
all of our group Pareto efficiency properties can be guaranteed. Furthermore, we use
new prices of fairness for our group properties similarly as for other properties in other
settings [2,7,24,30]. Finally, several related models are studied in [29,38,44]. However,
none of these focuses on axiomatic properties such as ours.
Preliminaries
We consider a setN = {a1, . . . , an} of agents and a set O = {o1, . . . , om} of indivisi-
ble items.We write π = (π1, . . . , πn) for an allocation of the items fromO to the agents
fromN with (1)∪na∈Nπa = O and (2) ∀a, b ∈ N, a 6= b : πa∩πb = ∅, where πa, πb de-
note the bundles of items of agents a, b ∈ N in π. We suppose that agents form groups.
We thus write πG for the bundle∪a∈Gπa of items of groupG, and uG(πH) for the utility
of G for the bundle πH of items of group H . We assume arithmetic-mean group utili-
ties. That is, uG(πG) =
1
k
·
∑
a∈G ua(πa) and uG(πH) =
1
k·h ·
∑
a∈G
∑
b∈H ua(πb),
where the groupG has k agents, the groupH has h agents and the utility ua(πb) ∈ R≥0
can be arbitrary for any agents a, b ∈ N (i.e. monotonic, additive, modular, etc.).
We next define our group fairness properties. Group envy-freeness captures the envy
of a group towards another group. Group Pareto efficiency captures the fact that we
cannot make each group weakly better off, and some group strictly better off. These
properties strictly generalize envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency whenever the group
sizes are fixed. Near group fairness is a relaxation of group fairness.
Definition 1 (group envy-freeness) For k, h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, an allocation π is (k, h)-
group envy-free (or simply GEFk,h) iff, for each group G of k agents and each group
H of h agents, uG(πG) ≥ uG(πH) holds.
Definition 2 (group Pareto efficiency) For k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, an allocation π is k-group
Pareto efficient (or simply GPEk) iff, there is no other allocation π
′ such that uG(π
′
G) ≥
uG(πG) holds for each group G of k agents, and uH(π
′
H) > uH(πH) holds for some
groupH of k agents.
Definition 3 (near group envy-freeness) For k, h ∈ {1, . . . , n} and α ∈ R[0,1], an
allocation π is near (k, h)-group envy-free wrt α (or simply GEFαk,h) iff, for each group
G of k agents and each groupH of h agents, uG(πG) ≥ α · uG(πH) holds.
Definition 4 (near group Pareto efficiency) For k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and α ∈ R[0,1], an
allocation π is near k-group Pareto efficient wrt α (or simply GPEαk ) iff, there is no other
allocation π′ such that α · uG(π′G) ≥ uG(πG) holds for each groupG of k agents, and
α · uH(π′H) > uH(πH) holds for some groupH of k agents.
We use prices to measure the “loss” in the welfarew(π) between these properties in
a given allocation π. The price of group envy-freeness pw
GEF
is maxk,h
maxpi1 w(pi1)
minpi2 w(pi2)
where
π1 is a (h, h)-group envy-free and π2 is a (k, k)-group envy-free with h ≤ k. The
price of group Pareto efficiency pw
GPE
is maxk,h
maxpi1 w(pi1)
minpi2 w(pi2)
where π1 is a h-group Pareto
efficient and π2 is a k-group Pareto efficient with h ≥ k. The price of group fairness
pw
FAIR
ismaxk
maxpi1 w(pi1)
minpi2 w(pi2)
where π1 is a (k, k)-group envy-free and π2 is a k-group Pareto
efficient. We consider these prices for common welfares such as the utilitarian welfare
u(π) =
∑
a∈N ua(πa), the egalitarian welfare e(π) = mina∈N ua(πa) and the Nash
welfare n(π) =
∏
a∈N ua(πa).
Finally, we write ΠH for the expected allocation of group H that assigns a proba-
bility value to each bundle of items, and uG(ΠH) for the expected utility of groupG for
ΠH . We observe that we can define our group properties in terms of expected utilities
of groups for expected allocations of groups.
Group envy freeness
We start with group envy-freeness for arithmetic-mean group utilities. Our first main
result is to give a taxonomy of strict implications between group envy-freeness notions
for groups of fixed sizes (i.e. GEFk,h for fixed k, h ∈ [1, n)). We present the taxonomy
in Figure 1.
GEFk,h ⇒ GEFk,h+1
⇓ ⇓
GEFk+1,h ⇒ GEFk+1,h+1
Fig. 1. A taxonomy of group envy-freeness properties for fixed k, h ∈ [1, n).
Our taxonomy contains n2 group envy-freeness axiomatic properties. By definition,
we observe that (1, 1)-group envy-freeness is equivalent to envy-freeness (or simply
EF) and (1, n)-group envy-freeness is equivalent to proportionality (or simply PROP).
Moreover, we observe that (n, 1)-group envy-freeness captures the envy of the group
of all agents towards each agent. We call this property grand envy-freeness (or sim-
ply gEF). (n, n)-group envy-freeness is trivially satisfied by any allocation. In our tax-
onomy, we can interpolate between envy-freeness and proportionality, and even be-
yond. From this perspective, our taxonomy generalizes existing taxonomies of fairness
concepts for individual agents with additive utilities [4,5]. We next prove the impli-
cations in our taxonomy. For this purpose, we distinguish between agent-group prop-
erties (i.e. (1, h)-group envy-freeness), group-agent properties (i.e. (k, 1)-group envy-
freeness) and group-group properties (i.e. (k, h)-group envy-freeness) for k ∈ [1, n]
and h ∈ [1, n].
Agent-group envy-freeness We now consider n properties for agent-group envy-free-
ness of actual allocations that capture the envy an individual agent might have towards a
group of other agents. These properties let us move from envy-freeness to proportional-
ity (i.e. there is h ∈ [1, n] such that “EF⇒ GEF1,h ⇒ PROP”). If an agent is envy-free
of a group of h ∈ [1, n] agents, then they are envy-free of a group of q ≥ h agents.
Theorem 1 For h ∈ [1, n], q ∈ [h, n] and arithmetic-mean group utilities, we have that
GEF1,h implies GEF1,q holds.
Proof. Let us pick an allocation π. We show the result by induction on i ∈ [h, q]. In the
base case, let i be equal to h. The result follows trivially in this case. In the induction
hypothesis, suppose that π is (1, i)-group envy-free for i < q. In the step case, let i be
equal to q. By the hypothesis, we know that π is (1, q − 1)-group envy-free. For the
sake of contradiction, let us suppose that π is not (1, q)-group envy-free. Consequently,
there is a group of q agents and an agent, say G = {a1, . . . , aq} and a 6∈ G, such
that inequality (1) holds for G and a, and inequality (2) holds for G, a and each agent
aj ∈ G.
ua(πa) < ua(πG) =
1
q
·
∑
b∈G
ua(πb) (1)
ua(πa) ≥ ua(πG\{aj}) =
1
(q − 1)
·
∑
b∈G\{aj}
ua(πb) (2)
We derive ua(πa) < ua(πaj ) for each aj ∈ G. Let us now form a group of (q − 1)
agents from G, say G \ {aq}. Agent a assigns arithmetic-mean value to the allocation
of this group that is larger than the value they assign to their own allocation. This con-
tradicts with the induction hypothesis. Hence, π is (1, q)-group envy-free. The result
follows. 
By Theorem 1, we conclude that (1, h)-group envy-freeness implies (1, h+1)-group
envy-freeness for h ∈ [1, n). The opposite direction does not hold. Indeed, (1, q)-group
envy-freeness is a weaker property than (1, h)-group envy-freeness for q > h. We
illustrate this in Example 1.
Example 1 Let us consider the fair division of 3 items o1, o2, o3 between 3 agents
a1, a2, a3. Further, let the utilities of agent a1 for the items be 1, 3/2 and 2, those of
agent a2 be 3/2, 2, and 1, and the ones of agent a3 be 2, 1 and 3/2 respectively. Now,
consider the allocation π that gives o2 to a1, o1 to a2 and o3 to a3. Each agent receives
in π utility 3/2. Hence, this allocation is not (1, 1)-group envy-free (i.e. envy-free) as
each agent assigns in it utility 2 to one of the other agents. In contrast, they assign in π
utility 3/2 to the group of all agents. We conclude that π is (1, 3)-group envy-free (i.e.
proportional).
The result in Example 1 crucially depends on the fact that there are 3 agents in
the problem. With 2 agents, agent-group envy-freeness is equivalent to envy-freeness
which itself is equivalent to proportionality. Finally, Theorem 1 and Example 1 hold for
expected allocations as well.
Group-agent envy-freeness We next consider n properties for group-agent envy-
freeness of actual allocations that capture the envy a group of agents might have towards
an individual agent outside the group. These properties let us move from envy-freeness
to grand envy-freeness (i.e. there is k ∈ [1, n] such that “EF⇒ GEFk,1 ⇒ gEF”). If a
group of k ∈ [1, n] agents is envy-free of a given agent, then a group of p ≥ k agents is
envy-free of this agent.
Theorem 2 For k ∈ [1, n], p ∈ [k, n] and arithmetic-mean group utilities, we have that
GEFk,1 implies GEFp,1 holds.
Proof. Let us pick an allocation π. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we show the result
by induction on i ∈ [k, p]. The most interesting case is the step case. Let i be equal to
p and suppose that π is (p− 1, 1)-group envy-free. For the sake of contradiction, let us
suppose that π is not (p, 1)-group envy-free. Consequently, there is a group of p agents
and an agent, say G = {a1, . . . , ap} and a 6∈ G, such that inequality (3) holds for G
and a, and inequality (4) holds forG, a and each aj ∈ G.
p · uG(πG) =
∑
b∈G
ub(πb) <
∑
b∈G
ub(πa) (3)
(p− 1) · uG\{aj}(πG\{aj}) =
∑
b∈G\{aj}
ub(πb) ≥
∑
b∈G\{aj}
ub(πa) (4)
We derive uaj(πaj ) < uaj (πa) for each aj ∈ G. Let us now form a group of
(p− 1) agents from G, say G \ {ap}. This group assigns arithmetic-mean value to the
allocation of agent a that is larger than the arithmetic-mean value they assign to their
own allocation. This contradicts with the fact that π is (p − 1, 1)-group envy-free. We
therefore conclude that π is (p, 1)-group envy-free.
By Theorem 2, we conclude that (k, 1)-group envy-freeness implies (k+1, 1)-group
envy-freeness for k ∈ [1, n). However, (p, 1)-group envy-freeness is a weaker property
than (k, 1)-group envy-freeness for p > k. We illustrate this in Example 2.
Example 2 Let us consider again the instance in Example 1 and the allocation π that
gives to each agent the item they value with 3/2. We confirmed that π is not (1, 1)-
group envy-free (i.e. envy-free). However, π is (3, 1)-group envy-free (i.e. grand envy-
free) because the group of all agents assigns in π utility 3/2 to their own allocation and
utility 3/2 to the allocation of each other agent.
The choice of 3 agents in the problem in Example 2 is again crucial. With 2 agents,
group-agent envy-freeness is equivalent to envy-freeness and proportionality. Finally,
Theorem 2 and Example 2 hold for expected allocations as well.
Group-group envy-freeness We finally consider n2 properties for group-group envy-
freeness of actual allocations that captures the envy of a group of k agents towards
another group of h agents. Similarly, we prove a number of implications between such
properties for fixed parameters k, h and p ≥ k, q ≥ h.
Theorem 3 For k ∈ [1, n], p ∈ [k, n], h ∈ [1, n], q ∈ [h, n] and arithmetic-mean group
utilities, we have that GEFk,h implies GEFp,q holds.
Proof. We prove by inductions that (1) (p, h)-group envy-freeness implies (p, q)-
group envy-freeness for any p ∈ [1, n], and that (2) (k, h)-group envy-freeness implies
(p, h)-group-envy freeness for any h ∈ [1, n]. We can then immediately conclude the
result. For p = 1 in (1) and h = 1 in (2), the base cases of the inductions follow from
Theorems 1 and 2. We start with (1). We consider only the step case. That is, let π be an
allocation that is (p, q−1)-group envy-free but not (p, q)-group envy-free. Hence, there
are groups G = {a1, . . . , ap} and H = {b1, . . . , bq} such that inequality (5) holds for
G andH , and inequality (6) holds forG, H and each bj ∈ H .
∑
a∈G
ua(πa) <
1
q
·
∑
a∈G
∑
b∈H
ua(πb) (5)
∑
a∈G
ua(πa) ≥
1
(q − 1)
·
∑
a∈G
∑
b∈H\{bj}
ua(πb) (6)
We derive
∑
a∈G ua(πa) <
∑
a∈G ua(πbj ) for each bj ∈ H which leads to a
contradiction with the (p, q− 1)-group envy-freeness of π. We next prove (2) for h = q
in a similar fashion. Again, we consider only the step case. That is, let π be an allocation
that is (p−1, q)-group envy-free but not (p, q)-group envy-free. Hence, there are groups
G = {a1, . . . , ap} and H = {b1, . . . , bq} such that inequality (5) holds for G and H ,
and inequality (7) holds forG, H and each aj ∈ G.
∑
a∈G\{aj}
ua(πa) ≥
1
q
·
∑
a∈G\{aj}
∑
b∈H
ua(πb) (7)
We obtain that q · uaj (πaj ) <
∑
b∈H uaj (πb) holds for each aj ∈ G. Finally, this
conclusion leads to a contradiction with the (p − 1, q)-group envy-freeness of π. The
result follows. 
By Examples 1 and 2, the opposite direction of the implication in Theorem 3 does
not hold with 3 or more agents. With 2 agents, group-group envy-freeness is also equiv-
alent to envy-freeness and proportionality. Finally, Theorem 3 also holds for expected
allocations.
Group Pareto efficiency
We continue with group Pareto efficiency properties for arithmetic-mean group utilities.
Our second main result is to give a taxonomy of strict implications between group
Pareto efficiency notions for groups of fixed sizes (i.e. GPEk for fixed k ∈ [1, n)). We
present the taxonomy in Figure 2.
GPEk+1 ⇒ GPEk
Fig. 2. A taxonomy of group Pareto efficiency properties for fixed k ∈ [1, n).
Our taxonomy contains n group Pareto efficient axiomatic properties. By definition,
we observe that 1-group Pareto efficiency is equivalent to Pareto efficiency, and n-group
Pareto efficiency to utilitarian efficiency. In fact, we next prove that the kth layer of
properties in our taxonomy is exactly between the (k − 1)th and (k + 1)th layers. It
then follows that k-group Pareto efficiency implies j-group Pareto efficiency for any
k ∈ [1, n] and j ∈ [1, k]. We now show this result for actual allocations.
Theorem 4 For k ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, k] and arithmetic-mean group utilities, we have that
GPEk implies GPEj holds.
Proof. The proof is by backward induction on h ∈ [j, k] for a given allocation π. For
h = k, the proof is trivial. For h > j, suppose that π is h-group Pareto efficient. For
h = j, let us assume that π is not j-group Pareto efficient. We write Gj for the fact that
group G has j agents. We derive that there is π′ such that both inequalities (8) and (9)
hold.
∀Gj :
∑
a∈Gj
ua(π
′
a) ≥
∑
a∈Gj
ua(πa) (8)
∃Hj :
∑
b∈Hj
ub(π
′
b) >
∑
b∈Hj
ub(πb) (9)
We next show that π′ dominates π in a (j+1)-group Pareto sense. That is, we show
that inequalities (10) and (11) hold.
∀G(j+1) :
∑
a∈G(j+1)
ua(π
′
a) ≥
∑
a∈G(j+1)
ua(πa) (10)
∃H(j+1) :
∑
b∈H(j+1)
ub(π
′
b) >
∑
b∈H(j+1)
ub(πb) (11)
We start with inequality (10). Let G(j+1) be a group of (j + 1) agents for which
inequality (10) does not hold. Further, let Gaj = G(j+1) \ {a} be a group of j agents
obtained from G(j+1) by excluding agent a ∈ G(j+1). By the fact that inequality (8)
holds for Gaj , we conclude that ua(π
′
a) < ua(πa) holds for each a ∈ G(j+1). We can
now form a set of j agents such that inequality (8) is violated for π′. Hence, inequality
(10) must hold. We next show that inequality (11) holds as well. Let H(j+1) be an
arbitrary group of (j +1) agents for which inequality (11) does not hold. By inequality
(8), we derive ub(π
′
b) ≤ ub(πb) for each b ∈ H(j+1). There cannot exist a group of j
agents for which inequality (9) holds for π′. Hence, inequality (11) must hold. Finally,
as both inequalities (10) and (11) hold, π is not (j + 1)-group Pareto efficient. This is a
contradiction.
The implication in Theorem 4 does not reverse. Indeed, an allocation that is 1-group
Pareto efficient might not be k-group Pareto efficient even for k = 2 and 2 agents. We
illustrate this in Example 3.
Example 3 Let us consider the fair division of 2 items o1, o2 between 2 agents a1, a2.
Further, suppose that a1 likes o1 with 1 and o2 with 2, whilst a2 likes o1 with 2 and
o2 with 1. The allocation π1 that gives both items to a1 is 1-group Pareto efficient (i.e.
Pareto efficient) but not 2-group Pareto efficient (i.e. utilitarian efficient). To see this,
note that π1 is 2-group Pareto dominated by another allocation π2 that gives o2 to a1
and o1 to a2. The utility of the group of two agents is 3/2 in π1 and 2 in π2.
We next consider expected allocations. We know that an expected allocation that is
Pareto efficient can be represented as a convex combination over actual allocations that
are Pareto efficient [9] (cited by 502 other papers in Google Scholar). This result holds
for actual allocations as well. We generalize this result to our setting with groups of
agents and bundles of items. That is, we show that a k-group Pareto efficient expected
allocation can be represented as a combination over k-group Pareto efficient actual allo-
cations. We believe that our result is much more general than the existing one because it
holds for arbitrary groups and bundle utilities (e.g. monotone, additive, modular, etc.).
In contrast, not each convex combination over Pareto efficient actual allocations repre-
sents an expected allocation that is Pareto efficient [9]. This observation holds in our
setting as well.
Theorem 5 For k ∈ [1, n], a k-group Pareto efficient expected allocation can be rep-
resented as a convex combination over k-group Pareto efficient actual allocations.
Proof. Let Π1 denote an expected allocation that is k-group Pareto efficient and c1
be a convex combination over group Pareto efficient allocations that represents Π1.
Further, let us assume that Π1 cannot be represented as a convex combination over k-
group Pareto efficient allocations. Therefore, there are two types of allocations in c1: (1)
allocations that are j-group Pareto efficient for some j ≥ k and (2) allocations that are
j-group Pareto efficient ex post for some j < k. By Theorem 4, allocations of type (1)
are k-group Pareto efficient. And, by assumption, allocations of type (2) are not g-group
Pareto efficient for any g > j. Let us consider such an allocation π in c1 of type (2)
that is not k-group Pareto efficient. Hence, π can be k-group Pareto improved by some
other allocation π′. We can replace π with π′ in c1 and thus construct a new convex
combination c1,π. We can repeat this for some other allocation in c1,π of type (2) that
is not k-group Pareto efficient. We thus eventually can construct a convex combination
c2 over k-group Pareto efficient ex post allocations with the following properties: (1)
there is an allocation π2 in c2 for each allocation π1 in c1 and (2) the weight of π2 in c2
is equal to the weight of π1 in c1. Let Π2 denote the allocation represented by c2.
Let c1 be over π1 to πh such that π1 to πi are k-group Pareto efficient and πi+1 to
πh are not group k-Pareto efficient. Further, by construction, let c2 be over π1 to πi and
π′i+1 to π
′
h such that π
′
g k-group Pareto dominates πg for each g ∈ [i+1, h]. We derive∑
al∈G
(ual(π
′
g)− ual(πg)) ≥ 0 for each group G of k agents and
∑
al∈H
(ual(π
′
g)−
ual(πg)) > 0 for some groupH of k agents. The expected utility ual(Π1) of agent al
in combination c1 is equal to
∑
g∈[1,i] w(πg) · ual(πg) +
∑
g∈[i+1,h] w(πg) · ual(πg).
The expected utility ual(Π2) of agent al in combination c2 is equal to
∑
g∈[1,i] w(πg) ·
ual(πg) +
∑
g∈[i+1,h] w(πg) · ual(π
′
g). Therefore,
∑
al∈G
(ual(Π2) − ual(Π1)) ≥ 0
holds for each groupG of k agents and
∑
al∈H
(ual(Π2)−ual(Π1)) > 0 holds for some
groupH of k agents. Hence,Π2 k-group Pareto dominatesΠ1. This is a contradiction
with the k-group Pareto efficiency ofΠ1. 
Theorem 5 suggests that there are fewer k-group Pareto efficient allocations than j-
group Pareto efficient allocations for j ∈ [1, k]. In fact, there can be substantially fewer
such allocations even with 2 agents. We illustrate this in Example 4.
Example 4 Let us consider again the instance in Example 3. Further, consider the
expected allocation Πǫ in which agent a1 receives item o1 with probability 1 and item
o2 with probability 1 − ǫ, and agent a2 receives item o2 with probability ǫ. In Πǫ, a1
receives expected utility 3 − 2ǫ and a2 receives expected utility ǫ. For each fixed ǫ ∈
[0, 1/2),Πǫ is 1-group Pareto efficient (i.e. Pareto efficient). Hence, there are infinitely
many such allocations. By comparison, there is just one 2-group Pareto efficient (i.e.
utilitarian efficient) allocation that gives to each agent the item they like with 2.
Interestingly, for an n-group Pareto efficient expected allocation, we can show both
directions in Theorem 5. By definition, such allocations maximize the utilitarian wel-
fare. We, therefore, conclude that an expected allocation is n-group Pareto efficient iff
it can be represented as a convex combination over actual allocations that maximize the
utilitarian welfare. Finally, Theorem 4 and Example 3 also hold for expected allocations
and Theorem 5 and Example 4 also hold (trivially) for actual a
Near group fairness
Near group fairness relaxes group fairness. Our near notions are inspired by α-fairness
proposed in [11]. Let k ∈ [1, n], h ∈ [1, n] and α ∈ [0, 1]. We start with near group
envy-freeness (i.e. GEFαk,h). For given k and h, we can always find a sufficiently small
value for α such that a given allocation satisfies GEFαk,h. Consequently, for given k and
h, there is always some α such that at least one allocation is GEFαk,h. By comparison,
for given k and h, allocations that satisfy GEFk,h may not exist. Therefore, for given
k, h and α, allocations that satisfy GEFαk,h may also not exist. For example, note that
GEFk,h is equivalent to GEF
α
k,h for each k, h and α = 1. Moreover, for given k, h
and α, we have that GEFk,h implies GEF
α
k,h holds. However, there might be allocations
that are near (k, h)-group envy-free with respect to α but not (k, h)-group envy-free.
We illustrate this for actual allocations in Example 5.
Example 5 Let us consider again the instance in Example 1 and the allocation π that
gives to each agent the item they like with 3/2. Recall that π is not (1, 1)-group envy-
free (i.e. envy-free). Each agent assigns in π utility 2 to one of the other agents and 1 to
the other one. For α = 3/4, they assign in π reduced utilities 2α, α to these agents. We
conclude that π is near (1, 1)-group envy-free wrt α (i.e. 3/4-envy-free).
For a given α, we can show that Theorems 1, 2 and 3 hold for the notions GEFαk,h
with any k and h. We can thus construct an α-taxonomy of near group envy-freeness
concepts for each fixed α. Moreover, for α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] with α2 ≥ α1, we observe that
an allocation satisfies an α2-property in the α2-taxonomy only if the allocation satisfies
the corresponding α1-property in the correspondingα1-taxonomy.We further note that
GEFα2k,h implies GEF
α1
k,h. By Example 5, this implication does not reverse.
We proceed with near group Pareto efficiency (i.e. GPEαk ). For a given k, allocations
satisfying GPEk always exists. For given k and α, we immediately conclude that allo-
cations satisfying GPEαk also always exists. Similarly as for near group envy-freeness,
GPEk is equivalent to GPE
α
k for each k and α = 1, and GPEk implies GPE
α
k for each k
and α. However, there might be allocations that are near k-group Pareto efficient with
respect to α but not k-group Pareto efficient. We illustrate this for actual allocations in
Example 6.
Example 6 Let us consider again the instance in Example 3 and the allocation π that
gives to each agent the item they like with 1. This allocation is not 1-group Pareto
efficient (i.e. Pareto efficient) because each agent receives utility 2 if they swap items in
π. For α = 1/2, π is not α-Pareto dominated by the allocation in which the items are
swapped. Moreover, π is not α-Pareto dominated by any other allocation. We conclude
that π is near 1-group Pareto efficient wrt α (i.e. 1/2-Pareto efficient).
For a given α, we can also show that Theorem 4 holds for the notions GPEαk with
any k. We can thus construct an α-taxonomy of near group Pareto efficiency properties
for each fixed α. In contrast to near group envy-freeness, allocations that satisfy an
α-property in an α-taxonomy always exists. Also, for α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] with α2 ≥ α1,
we observe that GPEα2k implies GEF
α1
k holds. By Example 6, we confirm that this is a
strict implication. Theorem 5 further holds for near k-group Pareto efficiency. Finally,
Examples 5 and 6 hold for expected allocations as well.
Prices of group fairness
We use prices of group fairness and measure the “loss” in social welfare efficiency
between different “layers” in our taxonomies. Our prices are inspired by the price of
fairness proposed in [7]. Prices of fairness are normally measured in the worst-case
scenario. We proceed similarly and prove only the lower bounds of our prices for the
utilitarian, the egalitarian and the nash welfares in actual allocations.
Theorem 6 The prices pu
GEF
, pu
GPE
, pu
FAIR
are all at least the number n of agents, whereas
the prices pe
GEF
, pe
GPE
, pe
FAIR
and pn
GEF
, pn
GPE
, pn
FAIR
are all unbounded.
Proof. Let us consider the fair division of n items to n agents. Suppose that agent
ai likes item oi with 1, and each other item with ǫ for some small ǫ ∈ (0, 1). For
k ∈ [1, n], let πk denote an allocation in which k agents receive items valued with 1
and (n− k) agents receive items valued with ǫ. By Theorem 3, πn is k-group envy-free
as each agent receives their most valued item. By Theorem 4, πn is also k-group Pareto
efficient. Further, for a fixed k, it is easy to check that πk is also k-group envy-free and
k-group Pareto efficient. We start with the utilitarian prices. The utilitarian welfare in
πn is nwhereas the one in πk is k as ǫ goes to 0. Consequently, the corresponding ratios
for “layer” k in each taxonomy all go to n/k. Therefore, the corresponding prices go
to n as k goes to 1. We next give the egalitarian and Nash prices. The egalitarian and
Nash welfares in πn are both equal to 1. These welfares in πk are equal to ǫ and ǫ
(n−k)
respectively. The corresponding ratios for “layer” k in each taxonomy are then equal to
1/ǫ and 1/ǫ(n−k). Consequently, the corresponding prices go to∞ as ǫ goes to 0. 
Theorem 6 holds for expected allocations as well. Finally, it also holds for near
group fair allocations.
Conclusions
We studied the fair division of items to agents supposing agents can form groups. We
thus proposed new group fairness axiomatic properties. Group envy-freeness requires
that no group envies another group. Group Pareto efficiency requires that no group
can be made better off without another group be made worse off. We analyzed the
relations between these properties and several existing properties such as envy-freeness
and proportionality.We generalized an important result from Pareto efficiency to group
Pareto efficiency. We moreover considered near group fairness properties. We finally
computed three prices of group fairness between such properties for three common
social welfares: the utilitarian welfare, the egalitarian welfare and the Nash welfare.
In future, we will study more group aggregators. For example, our results hold for
arithmetic-mean group utilities (i.e. Theorems 1-6). We can however also show them
for geometric-mean, minimum, or maximum group utilities (i.e. the root of the product
over agents’ utilities for the bundle, the minimum over agents’ utilities for the bundle,
the maximum over agents’ utilities for the bundle). We will also study the relations of
our group properties to other fairness properties for individual agents such as min-max
fair share,max-min fair share and graph envy-freeness. Finally, we submit that it is also
worth adapting our group properties to other fair division settings as well [1].
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